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ABSTRACT
The identification of vital nodes that maintain the network connectivity is a long-standing challenge in network science. In this
paper, we propose a so-called reverse greedy method where the least important nodes are preferentially chosen to make
the size of the largest component in the corresponding induced subgraph as small as possible. Accordingly, the nodes being
chosen later are more important in maintaining the connectivity. Empirical analyses on ten real networks show that the reverse
greedy method performs remarkably better than well-known state-of-the-art methods.
Introduction
Network science is playing an increasingly significant role in many domains including physics, sociology, engineering, biology,
management, and so on1. Because of the heterogeneous nature of real networks2, the overall connectivity of complex networks
may depend on a small set of nodes, usually named as hub nodes. Taking the Internet as an example, several vital nodes
attacked deliberately may lead to the collapse of the whole network3. Therefore, an efficient algorithm to identify vital nodes
that have critical impacts on the network connectivity can help to better prevent catastrophic outages in power grids or the
Internet3–6, maintain the connectivity or design efficient attacking strategies for communication networks7, improve urban
transportation capacity with low cost8, enhance robustness of financial networks9, and so on.
Till far, to identify vital nodes for network connectivity, the majority of known methods only make use of the structural
information10. Typical representatives include degree centrality11 (DC), H-index12, k-shell decomposition method13 (KS),
PageRank14 (PR), LeaderRank15, closeness centrality16 (CC), betweenness centrality17 (BC), and so on. For DC, nodes with
larger degrees are more vital. For H-index, nodes connecting with many large-degree neighbors are more important. KS assigns
a k-shell index to each node based on its topological location, where nodes closer to the core of the network will get higher
k-shell indices, and nodes in the periphery will get lower k-shell indices. The nodes with higher k-shell indices are considered
to be more vital. PR suggests that the importance of a node is determined by the influences of its neighbors. CC claims that a
node averagely closer to other nodes is more vital while BC assumes that a node locating in many shortest paths is of high
importance. Recently, Morone and Makse18 proposed a novel index called collective influence (CI), which is based on the site
percolation theory and can find out the minimal set of nodes that are crucial for the global connectivity. CI performs remarkably
better than many previous methods in identifying the nodes’ importance for network connectivity18, 19.
This paper proposed a novel method named reverse greedy (RG) method. The first word stands for the process that we add
nodes one by one to an empty network, which is inverse to the usual process that removes nodes from the original network. The
second word emphasizes that we choose the nodes added by minimizing the size of the largest component. Empirical analyses
on ten real networks show that RG performs remarkably better than well-known state-of-the-art methods.
Results
Algorithms
The core of the RG algorithm is the reverse process, which adds nodes one by one to an empty network while minimizes the
cost function until all nodes in the considered network are added. Then, nodes are ranked inverse to the order of additions,
that is to say, the later added nodes are more important in maintaining the network connectivity. Denote G(V,E) the original
network under consideration, where V and E are the sets of nodes and edges, respectively. This paper focuses on simple
networks, where the weights and directions of edges are ignored, and the self loops are not allowed. The reverse process starts
from an empty network G0(V0,E0), where V0 = /0 and E0 = /0. At the (n+1)th time step, one node from the remaining set
V −Vn is selected to add into the current network Gn(Vn,En) to form a new network of (n+1) nodes, say Gn+1(Vn+1,En+1).
Note that, all progressive networks Gn (n= 0,1,2, · · · ,N, with N being the size of the original network G) in the process are
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induced subgraphs of G. For example, Gn is consisted of all edges in G with both two ends belonging to Vn. According to the
greedy strategy, the selected node i should minimize the size of the largest component in Gn+1. If there are multiple nodes
satisfying this condition, we will choose the one with the help of another structural feature of the node i in G (e.g., degree,
betweenness, and so on). Therefore, the cost function can be defined as
cost(i,n+1) = Gmaxn+1(i)+ ε f (i), (1)
where Gmaxn+1(i) is the size of the largest component after adding node i into Gn, f (i) is a certain structural feature of node i in G,
and ε is a very small positive parameter that works only when Gmaxn+1(•) are indistinguishable for multiple nodes. Each time
step, we add the node minimizing the cost function into the network, and if there are still multiple nodes with the minimum
cost, we will select one of them randomly. This process stops after N time steps, namely all nodes are added with GN ≡ G. An
illustration of such process in a small network is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The process of RG in a network with six nodes. Here we use degree as the feature f and for convenience in the later
description we set ε = 0.01 (note that, we only require that ε is positive yet small enough). Initially, the network is empty. At
the first time step, Gmax1 (v1) = G
max
1 (v2) = G
max
1 (v3) = G
max
1 (v4) = G
max
1 (v5) = G
max
1 (v6) = 1, and cost(v1,1) = 1.04,
cost(v2,1) = 1.03, cost(v3,1) = 1.03, cost(v4,1) = 1.03, cost(v5,1) = 1.03, cost(v6,1) = 1.02. Therefore, we add node v6
into the network because cost(v6,1) is the smallest. In the second time step, Gmax2 (v1) = G
max
2 (v2) = G
max
2 (v3) = 1, and
Gmax2 (v4) = G
max
2 (v5) = 2, so we only compare three candidates v1, v2 and v3. Since cost(v1,1) = 1.04, cost(v2,1) = 1.03 and
cost(v3,1) = 1.03, we randomly select a node from {v2,v3}. Here we choose v2 for example. Repeat this process until all
nodes are added into the network. Finally, we get the ranking of nodes as {v4,v5,v1,v3,v2,v6}, in an inverse order of the
additions. The symbol n in the bottom of each plot stands for the corresponding time step.
Data Description
In this paper, ten real networks from disparate fields are used to test the performance of RG, including two collaboration
networks (Jazz and NS), one communication network (Email), three social networks (PB, Sex and Facebook), one transportation
network (USAir), one infrastructure network (Power), one technological network (Router) and one citation network (HepPh).
Jazz20 is a collaboration network of jazz musicians. NS21 is a co-authorship network of scientists working on network science.
Email22 describes email interchanges between users including faculty, researchers, technicians, managers, administrators, and
graduate students of the Rovira i Virgili University. PB23 is a network of US political blogs. Sex24 is a bipartite network in
which nodes are females (sex sellers) and males (sex buyers) and edges between them are established when males write posts
indicating sexual encounters with females. Facebook25 is a sample of the friendship network of Facebook users. USAir26 is the
US air transportation network. Power27 is the power grid of the western United States. Router28 is a symmetrized snapshot
of the structure of the Internet at the level of autonomous systems. HepPh29 is a citation network of high energy physics
phenomenology. These networks’ topological features (including the number of nodes, the number of edges, the average degree,
the clustering coefficient27, the assortative coefficient30 and the degree heterogeneity31) are shown in Table 1.
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Networks N E 〈k〉 C r H
Jazz 198 2742 27.6970 0.6334 0.0202 1.3951
NS 379 914 4.8232 0.7981 -0.0817 1.6630
Email 1133 5451 9.6222 0.2540 0.0782 1.9421
PB 1222 16714 27.3552 0.3600 -0.2213 2.9707
Sex 15810 38540 4.8754 0 -0.1145 5.8276
Facebook 63731 817090 25.6418 0.2532 0.1769 3.4331
USAir 332 2126 12.8072 0.7494 -0.2079 3.4639
Power 4941 6594 2.6691 0.1065 0.0035 1.4504
Router 5022 6258 2.4922 0.0329 -0.1384 5.5031
HepPh 34546 420877 24.3662 0.2962 -0.0063 2.6055
Table 1. The basic topological features of the ten real networks. N and E are the number of nodes and edges, 〈k〉 is the
average degree, C is the clustering coefficient, r is the assortative coefficient and H is the degree heterogeneity.
Empirical Results
We apply the widely used metric called robustness R32 to evaluate algorithms’ performance. Given a network, we remove one
node at each time step and calculate the size of the largest component of the remaining network until the remaining network is
empty. The robustness R is defined as32
R=
1
N
N
∑
Q=1
S(Q), (2)
where S(Q) is the number of nodes in the largest component divided by N after removing Q nodes. The normalization factor
1/N ensures that the values of R of networks with different sizes can be compared. Obviously, a smaller R means a quicker
collapse and thus a better performance.
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Figure 2. Comparing the performance of the background benchmark (random removal, denoted by blue circles), RG (red
stars) and the other seven benchmark algorithms (black symbols). The X-axis is the fraction of nodes being removed (i.e.,
Q/N), and the Y -axis denotes the number of nodes in the largest component divided by N (i.e., S(Q)). The four selected
networks are (a) Email, (b) Sex, (c) Facebook, and (d) HepPh, respectively. Other networks exhibit similar results.
Figure 2 shows the collapsing processes of four representative networks, resulted from the node removal by RG and other
benchmark algorithms (see details about these benchmark algorithms in Methods). Obviously, RG can lead to much faster
collapse than all other algorithms, and CI is the second best algorithm. Table 2 compares the robustness R of RG and other
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benchmarks. As shown in Table 2, every algorithm is better than the random removal and to our surprise, for all the ten
networks, RG is always the best. In most cases, CI is the second best algorithm. One can further observe that the advantage of
RG is particularly significant for sparse networks, such as Power and Router.
Networks Random BC CC DC H-index KS PR CI RG
Jazz 0.4808 0.3956 0.4199 0.4409 0.4497 0.4571 0.4262 0.3913 0.3477
NS 0.2752 0.0488 0.1336 0.0540 0.1155 0.1582 0.0524 0.0551 0.0252
Email 0.4442 0.2578 0.2893 0.2519 0.2836 0.2937 0.2395 0.2231 0.1844
PB 0.4615 0.2192 0.2908 0.2286 0.2578 0.2611 0.2155 0.1968 0.1740
Sex 0.3842 0.0841 0.2208 0.0725 0.0981 0.1142 0.0690 0.0604 0.0513
Facebook 0.4545 0.2935 0.3570 0.3137 0.3328 0.3389 0.2893 0.2671 0.2372
USAir 0.4321 0.1129 0.1442 0.1228 0.1498 0.1588 0.1072 0.1105 0.0942
Power 0.2069 0.0656 0.1973 0.0634 0.1090 0.2628 0.0594 0.0489 0.0088
Router 0.3044 0.0142 0.0686 0.0121 0.0136 0.0276 0.0136 0.0140 0.0063
HepPh 0.4765 0.3504 0.4259 0.3664 0.3931 0.4022 0.3371 0.3015 0.2657
Table 2. The performance, measured by robustness R, of the eight ranking methods on ten real networks. The best performed
method for each network, namely the lowest R in the corresponding row, is emphasized in bold. Notice that, we use the random
removal (Random) as the background benchmark in order to show the improvement by each method. The radius ` in CI is set
to 2, and the feature f (i) in RG is the degree of node i.
Discussion
To our knowledge, most previous methods directly identify the critical nodes by looking at the effects due to their removal10.
In contrast, our method tries to find out the least important nodes, so that the remaining ones are those critical nodes. To
our surprise, such a simple idea eventually results in an efficient algorithm that outperforms many well-known benchmark
algorithms. Beyond the percolation process considered in this paper, the reverse method provides a novel angle of view that
may find successful applications in some other network-based optimization problems related to certain rankings of nodes or
edges.
Lastly, we would like to emphasize that the current version of the RG algorithm is just the simplest implementation of the
above reverse idea. For example, instead of degree, f (i) can be designed in a sophisticated way to improve the algorithm’s
performance. In addition, the simple adoption of the greedy strategy may bring us to some local optimums. Such shortage can
be to some extent overcame by introducing the beam search33, which searches for the best set of m nodes adding to the network
that optimizes the cost function. The present algorithm is the special case for m= 1. Although beam search is still a kind of
greedy strategy, it usually performs much better when m is sufficiently large. At the same time, the beam search with large m
costs a lot on time and space. Therefore, how to find a good tradeoff is also an open challenge in real practice.
Methods
Benchmark Centralities
Degree Centrality11 of node i is defined as
DC(i) =∑
j
ai j, (3)
where A= {ai j} is the adjacency matrix, that is, ai j = 1 if i and j are directly connected and 0 otherwise.
H-index12 of node i, denoted by H(i), is defined as the maximal integer satisfying that there are at least H(i) neighbors of
node i whose degrees are all no less than H(i). Such index is an extension of the famous H-index in scientific evaluation34 to
network analysis.
PageRank14 of node i is defined as the solution of the equations
PRi(t) = s
N
∑
j=1
a ji
PR j(t−1)
k j
+(1− s) 1
N
, (4)
where k j is the degree of node j and s is a free parameter controlling the probability of a random jump. In this paper, s is set to
0.85.
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Closeness Centrality16 of node i is defined as
CC(i) =
N−1
∑
j 6=i
di j
, (5)
where di j is the shortest distance between nodes i and j.
Betweenness Centrality17 of node i is defined as
BC(i) = ∑
s 6=i,s 6=t,i 6=t
gst(i)
gst
, (6)
where gst is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t, and gst(i) is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and
t that pass through node i.
Collective Influence18 (CI) of node i is defined as
CI(i) = (ki−1) ∑
j∈∂ball(i,`)
(k j−1), (7)
where ball(i, `) is the set of nodes inside a ball of radius `, consisted of all nodes with distances no more than ` from node i,
and ∂ball(i, `) is the frontier of this ball.
Data Availability
All relevant data are available at https://github.com/MLIF/Network-Data2.
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